Insurgents Handbook

by Stan Goff

This book is being released in a serialized manner. If there isnt a link to a chapter, there will be one soon.

Table of Contents

  1. Introduction
  2. Insurgency-Counterinsurgency
  3. The Development of Domestic Counterinsurgency in the US
  4. Intelligence
  5. Counter-intelligence
  6. Tradecraft (Becoming Invisible)
  7. Adventure Sex
  8. Guns Self Defense
  9. The Gender Handoff
  10. Emergency
  11. Embeddedness Self-Organization
  12. Hearts Minds (and Stomachs Jesus)
  13. The Myth of Strategy
  14. Living the Struggle the Form Appropriate to the Situation
  15. Counterinsurgency Propaganda (Experts Institutions)
  16. The Law as a Counterinsurgency Weapon (Battlespace)
  17. Refusal as Resistance (The Permanent Strike)
  18. The ‘Burbs the ‘Hood (The Spatial-Scale Aspect)
  19. Logistics, Battlefield Recovery Self Sufficiency
  20. The Inescapability of Politics
  21. Dunbars Company (The Scale Aspect)
  22. Fighting



Insurgents Handbook T.O.C

Insurgents Handbook
by Stan Goff

No one should ever follow anyone who runs around saying The sky is falling! even if it is. Good leadership does not sow fear, but patience, realism, and Sisyphean determination. There are a lot of bad things in the world these days, and a bad system, and the people who run that system. When they are using naked brutality is the time to be least afraid of them. Their real power is based not on fear, which we can lose comparatively easily, but on dependency. The exercise of brutality is a sign of weakness, not strength, and from that revolutionaries should only take heart.

It’s easy enough for any of us to say, Stop crying wolf, and do something. But we need to have some idea what to do.

This handbook is for revolutionaries.

Revolution is defined here as a fundamental transformation of the power relations within a society.

A revolutionary is someone who is committed to this vision, and who actively works to bring it about.

in·sur·gent Pronunciation (n-sûrjnt) adj. 1. Rising in revolt against established authority, especially a government. 2. Rebelling against the leadership of a political party. n. One who is insurgent. [Latin nsurgns, nsurgent-, present participle of nsurgere, to rise up : in-, intensive pref.; see in-2 + surgere, to rise; see surge.]

Insurgents intensively rise up. Seems to me, at least, a good thing… if done effectively.

Recent uses of the word insurgent popularized in the media have been based on the US War Department’s characterization of anyone who opposes US military occupations abroad… or as a claim of status for locals killed by American bombs and bullets. Fifty Iraqis are killed, and the military reports that fifty insurgents are killed. The news media repeats these terms to appear in the know, which further popularizes and legitimates the terminology.

The technical use of the term by the US government began during the Vietnam occupation, and was incorporated into a specific military, then security (military and police) doctrine… called counterinsurgency. This is still a doctrine, and anyone who (1) opposes the government or (2) is known to be committed to the vision of transforming the fundamental relations of power in society, is considered to be an insurgent.

If we are called insurgents, and regarded as insurgents, and if the policies directed against our political vocation are counterinsurgency, then we’d better learn to become good insurgents. I worked inside the US government’s counterinsurgency apparatus for a very long time. That is why I am writing this handbook.

Any discussion of insurgency has to begin with Mao. Let me make a few preparatory comments to inoculate readers from the inevitable knee-jerk reactions.

(1) I am not a Maoist. I do not deify dead revolutionaries, or accept the transformation of contingent strategies and statements from the past into religious doctrines.

(2) Maoism was a theoretical perspective for national independence, not communism. This point is often missed, because the organization that developed what is called Maoism in practice was the Chinese Communist Party. They were the leading organization in a political struggle; but that struggle was not for communism, and they said so. It was for the more immediate goal of Chinese autarky.

(3) Maoism, the strategic theory, was developed for a specific time and place, China as a semi-feudal society, economically colonized, immersed in a cultural history of Confucianism, and militarily occupied by the Japanese. It is not universally transferable as a cookie-cutter principle for other places and times, cultures, or social systems. The minute anyone tries to sell me on Marxism- Leninism-Mao Zedong-Thought, s/he has already lost me. A bible-thumping, millenarian, Southern preacher will hold my attention more effectively; at least he is telling me something about the society that I live in.

(4) The specific approach of what has come to be called Maoism was developed in response to emerging situations during a protracted resistance, and tested in practice; it was not determined in someone’s head beforehand, then applied. It only became an Ism after the fact.

(5) Just because we cannot always generalize from specifics doesn’t mean no general principles ever emerge from specific circumstances. Hand washing is a generally good preventative medicine measure. Obviously, I believe that there are some more or less universal lessons that can be drawn from the Chinese Revolution led by Mao Zedong, or I wouldn’t be going to all this trouble to disclaim about the Maoist religious cults and their hagiographies of Mao, that serve to put a ridiculous face on the Chinese Revolution and any lessons we might learn from it.

(6) Math matters. That’s why I say we have to begin a discussion of insurgency with Mao. The Chinese Revolution, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, did succeed in achieving political independence for the largest country in the world, and largely succeeded in protecting that independence from hostile encirclement.

That which has survived in terms of validity from the Maoist tradition, in this writer’s humble opinion, is the organizing principle called mass line. The shorthand is, to think of the masses as in three general groups, based on how well they understand the system or the problem at hand: Advanced, Intermediate, and Backward. This is not a strict taxonomy, but one that facilitates a general method.

The guiding maxim of mass line is to consolidate the advanced with organization and strategic orientation that can (1) isolate the backward, and (2) win over the next layer of the intermediate to the advanced. This, of course, raises a lot of questions about what constitutes advanced and so forth, but even that is contingent upon circumstances. In organizing against the war in Iraq, for example, there were two distinct axes along which to plot out this schema: one programmatic, and one philosophic.

Within the larger mass movement, the programmatic question was unilateral and immediate withdrawal. Those with whom I organized in that movement defined this as the advanced position. Out now was advanced, stay and kill Ay-rabs was the backward (generalizing here), and those who wanted out but had questions about the repercussions of immediate withdrawal were the intermediate. The vast majority of those who were politically engaged and wanted to understand the war better, those in the intermediate category who we targeted to win over to the advanced, were consolidated around their opposition to the Bush administration… in other words, mostly Democrats. Obviously, an approach that identified all Democrats as the enemy and anyone who voted for Democrats as idiots would have defeated any chance we had of reaching that next layer of the intermediate. And so we concentrated our public education efforts on being present, supportive, and visible at anti-Bush venues, expressing solidarity with those who shared our alarm and revulsion at aspects of the Bush administration’s actions and policies, then providing information about (1) the bipartisan history of imperialism (without all the lefty jargon that stimulates a post- McCarthy hiccup) that led to the current conjuncture, and (2) pointed out the underlying premise of white supremacy that underwrote almost every concern about a bloodbath that would inevitably ensue in the absence of Western troops in Iraq. Isolating the backward, in this case, was a fairly straightforward case of persistently attacking a couple of key lies, i.e., that Saddam did 9-11 or that the US is a beacon of democracy in the region.

Within the somewhat smaller pool of people who are potential activists in a more general politics of resistance, the mass line approach focused more on philosophical orientation. Advanced was taken to mean anti-imperialist. Backward is seen as plain, uncritical, white-male patriotism. Intermediate are those who fall in neither category, with the next logical layer targeted for the advanced being those who are showing an active interest in the larger questions of history and social systems. Outreach here is more focused on teach-ins, workshops, book clubs, dinner-and-a-movie potlucks at people’s homes, and recruitment into actual work for political actions.

This is mass line in both mass work and political work, as the tradition calls it. It is not based, when done correctly, on promoting a line to the masses. It is based on paying close attention to the real grievances and anxieties of the masses themselves, and developing a political line out of that. The term line, which has been much abused, does not mean imposing ideological conformity on everyone, even though this became its distorted meaning under the war- communism of Stalin. It originally referred to a brick mason’s line, the string stretched on-level to go back and re-evaluate the placement of the last and next brick. It is a strategic orientation, which is not the same as a concrete strategy. In fact, I am going to argue that strategy should never be anything except an orientation written in pencil and not in ink, so to speak.

There is a reason I am taking readers through this Chinese museum.

The lessons of Maoism, and later of Che Guevara as well, as they relate to insurgency, were not just studied by the left around the world. Our own government has been studying them for decades, and its entire social policy at one level has been based on thinking of us as insurgents or potential insurgents. So in order to fully understand how the repressive apparatuses of the US state function, we have to understand that state’s organizing principles.

Saying that the US security state is becoming more repressive does not tell us much about it, nor does saying that the neo-cons are accelerating the pace of militarization of domestic and foreign policy. What specific military doctrines are being employed, based on what canon of military analysis?

The answer has been the same since Vietnam. The US-directed world system keeps (inevitably) throwing up resistance to an overwhelmingly superior technical military force, i.e., insurgency (or in the new vernacular, asymmetric warfare). Yet few of us actually study counter-insurgency doctrine to see what it is.

Like it or not, if we don’t go along with the dominant program, we are already insurgents. So we’d better be good at it.

Just as in the world-at-large, the claim that all political enemies are insurgents eventually creates the reality. An effective politics of resistance will require that we learn principles of insurgency that outmaneuver the operational principles of counter-insurgency, not by taking up arms (did you get that, guys?), but by exploiting the interstices of the system, amplifying grievances (while weeding out the backward contents of the populist impulse), setting up bases off the grid (with the Chinese, that was geographical, organizing in the countryside to eventually surround the cities), building strengths beyond the reach of the Panopticon, creating de facto alternative social systems, destroying the legitimacy of the existing order in the minds of the masses, and eventually taking political power for the express purpose of establishing popular sovereignty.

Insurgency / Counter-insurgency

Insurgents Handbook T.O.C
by Stan Goff

I want to begin this section by thanking Ken Lawrence and Kristian Williams for the excellent pamphlet The New State Repression (Tarantula Press). We don’t use pamphlets enough any more. From The New State Repression:

Today’s political repression differs fundamentally from the repression practiced around the world in the past. The most basic difference is on the level of strategy the general approach of the state, the outlook of the ruling class.

Their belief is that insurgency is not an occasional, erratic idiosyncrasy but a constant occurrence permanent insurgency, which calls for a strategy of permanent repressionas the full-time task of the security forces.

In preparing to examine the validity of this claim, let’s go to the source: the US government.


1-1. An insurgency is organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. It is a protracted politicomilitary struggle designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control. Political power is the central issue in an insurgency. (from FMI 3-07.22 , the US Army’s latest field manual on “counterinsurgency”, October 2004)

This could have been written by Mao Zedong.

It does not say simply armed conflict. It says subversion and armed conflict.

This particular field manual was written to incorporate the lessons of Iraq. In a very real sense, the tail was wagging the dog, since rather than reformulate their basic premises about insurgency and counter-insurgency (I/CI), they reformulated their experiences in Iraq to fit with their preconceptions about I/CI. Welcome to the American government.

The American way of war includes mass, power, and the use of sophisticated smart weapons. However, large main force engagements that characterized conflict in World War II, Korea, and Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom in the Middle East have become the exceptions in American warfare. Since the American Revolution, the Army has conducted stability operations, which have included counterinsurgency operations. Over the past half-century alone, the Army gained considerable experience in fighting insurgents in Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, Philippines), Latin America (Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua), Africa (Somalia), Southwest Asia (Afghanistan), and now the Middle East (Iraq). Dealing with counterinsurgency since the Vietnam War has fallen largely on SOF [special operations forces]; however, conventional forces have frequently come into contact with insurgent forces that seek to neutralize the inherent advantages of size, weaponry, and conventional force TTP [techniques, tactics, and principles]. Insurgents use a combination of actions that include terror, assassination, kidnapping, murder, guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices aimed at US and multinational forces, the host countrys leaders, and ordinary citizens.

While this introductory statement is self-consciously inclusive of the recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan (neither of which has been adequately or accurately interpreted), it does freely admit that US special operations forces were involved in places where the US had heretofore denied they were actually participating, i.e., Colombia, Peru, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, the first four in which I personally participated in US military missions between 1983-92. I was in Vietnam, as an infantryman, in 1970-71.

Nowhere does this document acknowledge directly that the conventional capacity of US armed forces makes asymmetric warfare (which they selectively call terrorism, depending on the political content of specific actions) more likely, though this can be easily inferred. The most remarkable thing, however, about this doctrine (FM’s represent doctrine), is the utter inability to differentiate between, say, Colombia, Nicaragua, and Iraq. What this tells us is that either (1) they don’t know any better, or (2) acknowledging the differences carries too high a degree of political risk in the indoctrination of military officers. In either case, the implication is the same for our purposes here: they are hobbled by their own doctrine. To this we shall return.

Counterinsurgency is those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. It is an offensive approach involving all elements of national power; it can take place across the range of operations and spectrum of conflict. It supports and influences an HN’s IDAD [host nation’s internal defense and development] program. It includes strategic and operational planning; intelligence development and analysis; training; materiel, technical, and organizational assistance; advice; infrastructure development; tactical-level operations; and many elements of PSYOP [psychological operations]. Generally, the preferred methods of support are through assistance and development programs. Leaders must consider the roles of military, intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement, information, finance, and economic elements (MIDLIFE) in counterinsurgency. (emphasis added)

Here we have to make a conceptual leap. The US Department of Homeland Security is, at its very base, a counter-insurgency organization, imperial references to “host nations” notwithstanding.

We cannot start the history of the I/CI bias of the US state with 9-11. That pivotal event was used merely to accelerate a process already in motion, and to author a massive government reorganization that would consolidate a higher level of executive power and simultaneously bust the government workers’ union (American Federation of Government Employees AFGE). This makes more sense than many realize, because ever since the Vietnam occupation, when US domestic security adopted a I/CI model for population control, breaking mass organizations like unions already a part of I/CI doctrine abroad has been integral to the I/CI doctrines.

The most infamous of the US state’s domestic counterinsurgency operations was the FBI-directed counter-intelligence program (COINTELPRO), a massive, often extra-legal covert operations campaign directed at a whole range of social activist organizations and individuals in the 1960s and 70s.

The original adoption of I/CI doctrine by domestic state security forces in the US was a panicked reaction to the social upheavals of the 1960s, most especially the Black Freedom Movement (BFM). The anti-war movement that emerged toward the end of this decade was largely facilitated by the ruling class disruptions caused by the BFM and the culture of resistance that was in its wake.

The Southern BFM, under the leadership of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ella Baker, E. D. Nixon, and others, basing itself on a composite strategic approach of Ghandian non-violence and the unique Black culture of prophetic Prostestantism, succeeded in forcing an end to legal Apartheid in the US South. This disruption was so profound that the white, male ruling class in the US was forced to employ its own troops to resolve the fracture within that class. King’s 1968 assassination likely with collaboration from elements within the federal government decisively provoked the end of the non-violent strategic orientation that has so disoriented the US ruling stratum; but it created a new situation where the center of political gravity within the BFM shifted to militant Black nationalism, based in large cities, even in the North, and open urban rebellions called race riots accelerated after breaking out across the country in 1967. The mostly white, student-based anti-war movement, shortly after King’s assassination and the urban insurrections in reaction to it, were publicly attacked in a police riot during the Chicago-based convention of the Democratic Party.

More and more, the nation watched newsreels where American cities had more military uniforms in evidence than police uniforms. It was inevitable that the US white, male ruling class would begin to see their situation the potential destabilization of power as a state of war.

There was one country that had already accumulated experience in domestic, imperial warfare, and that was Great Britain in Northern Ireland. The theorist of that British “local” occupation and of several distant ones (Kenya 1953-5, Malaya 1957, Cyprus 1962-4) was General Frank Kitson. He termed these multi-modal forms of resistance subversion and insurgency (SI), and developed a doctrinal philosophy for confronting them: low-intensity operations, later to be reformulated by the US as low-intensity conflict (LIC). Kitson published this philosophy as a book in 1971, Low Intensity Operations – Subversion, Insurgency, and Peacekeeping (Faber Faber, 1971). This was to differentiate it from the high-intensity conflict, as described in the excerpt above from the Army’s new field manual.

Paul Brennan, a member of the Irish resistance who has escaped from Long Kesh Prison and is in hiding, noted in 1993 that:

Northeast Ireland is the Central America of Great Britain. It is a population-control laboratory for the British military /constabulary/intelligence community to try to test the theories of General Frank Kitson. All present British policy, both political and military, can be found in his book Low Intensity Operations. The late general would be well pleased with the model northeast Ireland has become in providing a unique testing ground for his philosophies.

Brennan’s characterization of LIC (or I/CI doctrine) as being fundamentally based on the exercise of “population control” is an extremely important insight into this doctrine, particularly as it relates to domestic operations in the US. Obviously, population control has always been a preoccupation of the state. But I/CI makes some fundamental assumptions that shape population control practices.

“Their belief is,” again quoting Lawrence, “that insurgency is not an occasional, erratic idiosyncrasy but a constant occurrence permanent insurgency, which calls for a strategy of permanent repression as the full-time task of the security forces.”

Kitson explicitly theorized two key aspects of the current approach: (1) that power automatically creates resistance, and that resistance is always a potential state of insurgency, even when things seem perfectly calm and stable, and (2) that in order to control the real enemy (the population), false enemies had to be employed to implant the state’s paranoia in the minds of the population in order to counter that latent resistance.

Ian Buckley, writing about Kitson, explains the latter.

It was…General Frank Kitson… who first thought up the concept that was later used in the formation of Al Qaeda. He called it the ‘pseudo gang’ – a state sponsored group used to advance an agenda, while discrediting the real opposition. The strategy was used in both Kenya and Northern Ireland. In the case of Northern Ireland, most of the violence that was attributed to ‘Loyalists’ was in actuality not their handiwork, but the result of the activities of the death squads affiliated to the British secret state.

Christian Parenti, who has done extensive research and writing on the US prison system one of the key arms of US population control explained in an interview:

I chart the rise of the emerging anti-crime police state in the United States from the 1960s to the present. The first wave of this current buildup that were experiencing, a wave that starts in the 1960s, can be seen in many ways as counterinsurgency by other means theres no better example of this than [Nixons aide] H. R. Haldemans quote in his diary when discussing Nixons war on drugs: he tells that the president says the real issue is the blacks, and the solution is to devise a system of control that acknowledges this while not seeming to. That is their description of the war on drugs: a way of controlling insurgent populations and insurgent neighborhoods. By the 1980s the politics shift to some extent because there isnt the same level of insurgency in America that there was in the 60s and 70s.Its still very much about class and racial control…

The World Communist Conspiracy was replaced by the War on Drugs as a place-marker until the Global War on Terror could be constructed. This is classic Kitson.


Dev of Domestic CI in the US

Insurgents Handbook T.O.C
by Stan Goff

The Development of Domestic Counterinsurgency in the US

James Madison once said, “War is the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.�? He didn’t say that when there is not war to support an agenda of executive aggrandizement, a war shall have to be invented.

Lawrence, writing in his 1985 pamphlet The New State Repression, 16 years before 9-11, said:

Political repression exists in three discernable forms: police brutality, which is widespread violence committed by armed agents of the state against members of oppressed communities, nationalities, and classes, usually of a diffuse and relatively random character; vigilantism, which is violence committed by ostensibly private (non-government) individuals and organizations, sometimes random but more typically aimed at explicit targets [I will include sexual and domestic violence against women in this category, which will be explained later in this handbook. -SG]; and secret police activity, nearly always directed by elite government agencies against carefully chosen enemies considered to be political threats to established authority.

The existence of non-official, and non-systematic violence as a means of repression cannot be over-emphasized. Just as the Geneva Conventions and the Laws of Warfare international laws that govern warfare explicitly forbid many of the practices that are generally the only efficacious methods available to armed political resistance movements the domestic control apparatus has an interest in maintaining a legal framework that favors established power.

The absence of uniforms, for example, is a common condition of armed resistance movements, yet this is explicitly outlawed in the post-WWII international legal framework.

Domestic “security�? measures have to be seen in more than their legal framework. Strict interpretations of state actions are forced through gauntlet of difficult probative criteria, while the extra-legal actions of police in oppressed communities and the exercise of vigilantism, even when it supports the existing power structure, is seen as externalto the system, though it is an essential adjunct.

As insurgents, we must work outside the legal framework. That is not saying we should break the law, or that we shouldnt. It is saying that we cannot accept the legalistic framework of the ruling stratum as our analytical framework. We have to see and name the extra-legal dimensions of political repression, of counterinsurgency directed against us, in order to appreciate the counterinsurgent state in its entirety.

Lawrence’s pamphlet was written in 1985, before the Clinton administration passed the so-called Crime Bill, which with its add-ons has resulted in the largest per capita prison population in history (around 725 inmates per 100,000 of population… China’s per capita rate is around 110 per 100,000). According to Wikipedia, “In 2002 roughly 93.2 % of prisoners were male. About 10.4 % of all black males in the United States between the ages of 25 and 29 were sentenced and in prison by year’s end, compared to 2.4 % of Hispanic males and 1.2 % of white males. As of June 30, 2005, about 1 out of every 136 U.S. residents was incarcerated either in prison or jail. The total amount being 2,186,230, with 1,438,701 in State and Federal prisons and 747,529 in local jails.�?

Prison is the fourth leg of US domestic counterinsurgency. And again, special attention is given to African America, attention that has been a constant since Nixon began employing counterinsurgency doctrine as domestic “law enforcement.�?

Just as Kitson used Northern Ireland as a “population-control laboratory,�? the US state uses African America as its counterinsurgency laboratory.

H. R. Halderman’s memoirs of Nixon’s revulsion toward Blacks and his belief that they are “the whole problem,�? does not show that fear motivates policy-makers; it shows that the real policy-makers, the ones behind the scenes, have to mount successful persuasion efforts aimed at decision-makers, like Nixon.

An important example of this is Louis Giuffrida.

When Nixon was bombing Cambodia and spying on his domestic “enemies�? in 1971, then-Governor Ronald Reagan had hired a retired Army Colonel, Louis Giuffrida, to run a training program for California “emergency management personnel.�?

In 1966, six Black law students had founded an organization in response to pervasive anti-Black police brutality (one of the pillars of population control) in the Bay Area. They named it the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense. Harassment and provocation by the State of California, and counter-provocations by the BPP, led to the arrest of BPP leaders in 1968-9, and a gun battle between the BPP and police in 1969. Meanwhile, the BPP had branched out across the country. Eventually the BPP became the primary target of the counterinsurgency program COINTELPRO, and was destroyed. The point here is that Reagan hired Giuffrida to train California’s security apparatus in counterinsurgency.

It should not be lost on readers that when Reagan became president he appointed Giuffrida the first head of a new agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Giuffrida started his 1970 training program in California by establishing the California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI), which not only trained California’s “emergency responders�? in counterinsurgency, but police from across the country. As California goes, so they say, so goes the nation. Nixon’s felonious Attorney General Edwin Meese became tight with Giuffrida and facilitated the national outreach of the CSTI.

One of Giuffrida’s CSTI texts was for a course called “Civilian Violence and Terrorism,�? in which students were indoctrinated in the racialist rationalizations required to support a program of counterinsurgency, using African America as the “population-control laboratory.�?

The racially separated segments of our society, as they have done repeatedly in the past, have emerged with periods of sporadic violence. A white man cannot ever be black, red, or brown and so long as the white man remains superior in numbers he will be the repressor and the constant target of the mad dog.

This was being taught to federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and emergency response personnel. But the more instrumental logic of power is revealed later in the same text. The text unapologetically acknowledges that American expansion was accomplished by the extermination and imprisonment of indigenous people, and notes that to keep that power, more of the same was in order.

With the exception of the mentally deranged or the intoxicated person, all acts of illegal and criminal violence have roots somewhere in our present social, economic, or political environment.

[Our] mission can be accomplished only if we fully understand that … legitimate violence is integral to our form of government for it is from this source that we can continue to purge our weakness… [I’ll leave reader’s to psychoanalyze the skin-crawling masculinity behind this choice of words. -SG]

It is necessary for the police executive to treat his occupation like all other executives. He must do it well but not so well he puts himself out of a job. He must reduce crime but not stop it.

He faces an impossible task of being required by law (actually or by his own interpretation) to preserve a free and democratic society and at the same time he must eliminate crime and violence. These tasks are totally incompatible…

This heavy-handed approach in foreign policy led directly to the Iran-Contra-Cocaine fiasco during the Reagan presidency, in which most of the principles avoided jail time, including the President of the United States, but where anyone who paid the least attention knew that this was a legal technicality and that the administration was guilty as hell. The whole episode created a crisis for the American security state and its domestic counterinsurgency strategy, by putting the alarming accumulation of executive power on public display.

Across the Atlantic, Reagan’s friend and collaborator, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had fallen prey to her own coterie of right-wing intelligence operators. One of the leaders of this crew was Brian Crozier.

Australian-born, and raised primarily in France, Crozier followed the Christopher Hitchens trajectory of detached academic leftist turned reactionary. This has also been the personal ideological path of several neo-cons, once enamored of sectarian Trotskyisms (alas, there are many). Crozier made a career out of free-lancing around the edges of the Anglo-American intelligence agencies throughout the Cold War as a kind of journalist/consultant (he was a propagandist). He was, in fact, a proto-neo-con; and he convinced Thatcher to support a private intelligence agency that would assist Thatcher in defeating the so-called Left in UK. Crozier also helped Thatcher write her speeches in ways suggestive of the future message-control of Karl Rove. For Crozier, the definition of Left was quite broad. He once said, warning of an impending leftist takeover, that UK had come to be “dominated by extreme Left Labour MPs and trade unions, whose long term goal. is to transform Britain into another East Germany or Czechoslovakia. Without a correctly motivated intelligence and security apparatus, the subversives would win.�?

Thatcher’s clueless intransigence eventually led to her political downfall, at the hands of her own party, in 1990. Reagan shuffled off to become a right-wing propaganda icon. The US invaded Iraq, and in this transitional moment, the Third Way was being prepared by a CIA-constructed British Labor Party and a Democratic Leadership Council-constructed US Democratic Party, in the persons of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair.

With them, a more nuanced approach to domestic counterinsurgency was inaugurated, relying more directly on the maxims of another British military pensioner with experience in Northern Ireland, Robin Evelegh.

Evelegh pointed out the inevitable drawbacks of a highly secretive executive and the constant employment of directly draconian measures.

A community that does not support the Police can be policed effectively, but it is markedly different from policing a community that helps its Police. The case is therefore made for the two fundamental measures necessary to achieve detection in a population… These are: to provide for the compulsory registration and identification of the population so that the Security Forces can know who is who, what they look like and where they live; and to make the active development of informers… by the Security Forces not only lawful but as easy as possible.

Lawrence remarked on Evelegh:

Methods currently in use in the U.S. have reduced the “political price�? even further than Evelegh envisioned. Media campaigns to frighten parents about the possibility that their children might be kidnapped are followed by a concerted police/school/corporation (usually McDonald’s) offer to help protect kids by fingerprinting and photographing them; thus they are registered with the police long before they have any idea of the possible consequences [now DNA is routinely collected from kids -SG]. And Selective Service has purchased lists of young men who signed up long ago at an ice cream store to receive free treats for their birthdays; the government uses the lists to find 18-year-olds who haven’t registered for the draft.

The United States has managed to pursue a “two track�? strategy, employing both Evelegh and Kitson’s proposals simultaneously. At the same time as apparently benign Evelegh-type policies are being implemented, such as requiring every child on Welfare to have a Social Security number, the more draconian Kitson methods are also advancing, mostly under the banner of anti-terrorism. [Readers are reminded that this was authored in 1985. -SG]

While the Bush administration has re-employed higher levels of Kitsonesque brutality in its domestic counterinsurgency, their most significant attempts have been to improve intelligence collection efforts directed at the US population, which was emphasized much more strongly by Evelegh.




Study Guide: Ideological Struggle Against Revisionism

The Marxist-Leninist

This a section of M-L Study Guide. The other sections are found here:

“It cannot be disputed that these arguments of the revisionists amounted to a fairly well-balanced system of views, namely, the old and well-known liberal-bourgeois views.” – V. I. Lenin, “Marxism and Revisionism”


Beginning and Essential readings

Supplemental readings

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How I learned to stop worrying and LOVE JUCHE – Stan Goff


by Stan Goff

October 14 , 2003, 300 PDT, (FTW) — The brouhaha about North Korean nuclear weapons is panicking plenty of people these days. For all the wrong reasons.

The most recent repositioning of Chinese troops along the border with North Korea (the actual name of this country is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [DPRK], and the name of “South Korea” is the Republic of Korea [ROK]) reported in Asia Times has led to yet another round of speculation in the press. In particular, there is concern related to the reported deployment of heavy mechanized Chinese forces inside the 100-kilometer exclusion zone established trilaterally between China, DPRK, and Russia.

In fact, the key to understanding the immense and shifting strategic complexity of Korea is recognition of the fact that the peninsula has something in common with Afghanistan – really bad geographic luck. It borders two historic rivals, who happen to be strategic and economic rivals with the Untied States – China and Russia. And the key to understanding the apparent rivalry between DPRK and the United States is recognition that US provocation on the peninsula is aimed not at subordinating DPRK, but at control over Korea as a whole.

This site and others have explored the geostrategic issues between the US, Russia, and China at some length, so I’ll spare the reader a recounting. The primary point I will make is that China will become the world’s largest consumer of oil within the next decade, if current trends hold (which I will say they cannot, but that’s also another article), that China’s domestic production of oil has passed its Hubbert peak and is in permanent decline (increasing China’s dependence on imports), and throwing it into direct conflict with the US – now the world’s biggest energy hog – which will also vastly increase its demand for foreign oil, if current trends continue. And China is now systematically hollowing out the US industrial base with its sea of landless labor through the Trade Deficit.

In preparation for this historic conflict, and in spite of the financial and economic Gordian knots that now bind China and the United States, the US has already begun attempting the military encirclement of China. As many readers know, well before 9/11, military plans were already off the shelf to invade Afghanistan, a country that lies directly on the land route between China and the Gulf States, where overland pipelines might transport energy from the sweet crude fields of Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia (as well as oil and natural gas from the Caspian region) to the world’s largest and fastest growing economy.

Again, without digressing, it is important to point out that simple military encirclement is inadequate, as both a US strategy and as a lens for understanding the geopolitics of Asia and the United States.

What needs to be de-mystified here, however, is Korea itself, and its relationship to the US, beginning with the US occupation of Korea in 1945 after the defeat of Japan.

Prior to the Second World War, Korea had lived under the boot of Japan since Japan’s 1905 annexation of the Korean peninsula. Korea was a distinct culture in the region, one that had leapt ahead of other East Asians in literacy when an enlightened despot, King Sejong of the Choson Dynasty phonetically alphabetized the Korean language in 1446, making literacy the province of the whole population. The alphabet, called Hangul, eventually gave its name to the language itself, and Koreans even refer to themselves by this term – a form of powerful national identification.

Annexation and occupation by the Japanese was a terrible humiliation and the source of a powerful and widespread Korean popular resistance that gestated in the belly of the Japanese occupation and sprang into the open after the Second World War.

When the Americans occupied southern Korea in the wake of WWII (with Soviet occupation of the North), Koreans in both regions looked forward to a quick transition to reunification and self-determination. But an openly racist US general, John R. Hodge, was installed as the virtual viceroy of the ROK. The US quickly moved to re-establish relations with its recent enemies in Germany and Japan as part of a containment strategy against the Soviets and Chinese. Hodge summarily put the most despised ROK officials, those who had openly collaborated with Japan, in charge of the nation’s government, under his direction.

Nationalist insurrection broke out, with various nationalist and communist groups joining forces, and civil war ensued. In the larger context of the Cold War, Korea became an international battleground involving the Americans, Soviets, and Chinese. Under American pressure, and a vote taken when the USSR’s representative was absent from the Security Council, the United Nations itself lent its legitimacy to the US forces in the South.

In 1950, forces based in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) of the north, launched a blindingly successful offensive ground action against ROK forces, pushing ROK forces off the peninsula and almost wholly onto Taegu Island. An American expeditionary force that was sent to help the ROK – fully expecting the DPRK forces to break and run at the sight of US troops – was instead delivered a swift and humiliating defeat at the hands of a highly disciplined and well-trained DPRK military. US ground forces had been allowed to deteriorate in number and quality since the Second World War, and their performance was miserable.

As US reinforcements poured onto the peninsula to engage the Korean War in earnest, Hodge declared that fully 30 percent of the Koreans in the south were sympathetic to communist forces; a claim that was only partially true, since the issue was not ideological, but national. A secret policy in the US armed forces was adopted, one that has just received exposure in the last couple of years: episodic massacres of Korean civilians.

Revelations of the massacre at No Gun Ri in 1950, where upwards of 300 Korean civilians were systematically murdered by the American 1st Cavalry Division and the US Air Force, led to further investigations of American conduct during the Korean War. It is becoming ever clearer that hundreds of thousands of Korean civilians were murdered with the complicity and participation of US troops by ROK’s hated Syngman Rhee regime.

The US media, as craven as ever, collaborated in the cover-up of No Gun Ri and the whole US conduct of the war, which is why it is still not generally understood.

After the lightning advance of DPRK against ROK and American troops in 1950, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the wholesale destruction of Korea. His orders were to destroy “every means of communication, every installation, factory, city and village from the front line to the Yalu River.” [italics mine-SG] This was also the world’s introduction to a new weapon, napalm. Within two years, nearly every human settlement in the North had been subjected to firebombing, and the vast majority of targets were civilian. Electricity production was destroyed. Dams were ruptured, flooding the precious rice plains that had been carefully developed between the rugged mountains. American pilots machine-gunned the peasants in the North for sport. Tibor Meray, a Hungarian correspondent returned from a tour of the North in a state of utter shock. There were, he reported, “no more cities in North Korea.” In the South, American-led massacres were combined with wholesale executions by the ROK government of anyone remotely suspected of being “subversive.” In the end, according to General Curtis LeMay, “We burned down just about every city in North and South Korea both, and… we killed off over a million civilian Koreans and drove several million more from their homes.” Four million people died in the Korean War.

When the war was fought to a standstill at the DMZ, with Chinese and DPRK troops having mounted a blood-drenched war of attrition to push the UN/US back, DPRK consolidated itself against future attacks by placing itself on a permanent war footing, and by adopting an internal policy of isolation and self-reliance, called juche sasang. This official ideology is what the US press and political establishment now portray as “deranged.”

The authoritarian US-client government of the ROK continued harsh repression of its population for decades afterward, as US troops occupied bases across the country, generating hundreds of GI border-towns whose primary industries were alcohol by the drink and prostitution, offending the sensibilities of the majority of Koreans.

A popular rebellion against the Chun Doo Hwan regime and the US broke out in Kwangju in 1980, and the ROK army, with assistance from the US armed forces, massacred over 2,000 resisters.

In 1993, Private Ken Marcel, US Army, was drunk. He attempted to coerce sex from Yun Kum Yi, a young Korean woman, who rebuffed him. So Marcel beat her to death, tore off her clothes, pushed an umbrella into her anus, a bottle into her vagina, then shook a box of laundry detergent onto her bloody, desecrated corpse. Anti-American demonstrations flared again, and were put down with brutal force by the ROK government.

Prior to the last general election in ROK (2002), another mass uprising happened in reaction to the exoneration of US Army Sergeants Fernando Nino and Mark Walker, whose armored vehicle ran over and killed Korean 14-year-olds Misun and Hyosun, two schoolgirls on their way to a birthday party.

What brought decades of anti-American resentment boiling to the surface was not just an apparent negligent homicide, in which the company commander was also implicated (and exonerated). ROK courts have long abdicated their jurisdiction over US occupying forces through a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which turns the vast majority of GIs who commit crimes in Korea back over to US military authorities for adjudication. SOFA is more than a symbol. It’s the legal embodiment of US military domination of the ROK since the Korean War.

American soldiers commit around 600 crimes a year in ROK. Less than four percent are tried in a ROK court.

The election of populist-nationalist, Roh (pronounce it ‘No.’) Moo-hyun, came in the wake of a campaign where the defining issue became who could demonstrate the most muscular anti-Americanism.

This is the context within which provocations by the US against DPRK must be understood. The greatest US fear on the peninsula, especially since ROK mounted an economic challenge in the region as one of the “Asian tigers”, is reunification, which would eliminate the US pretext for continuing its military occupation of the southern half of the peninsula. The US would lose its most important forward base in Asia, and the one positioned on the doorstep of China.

In 1993, when reunification talks were proceeding apace between North and South, at the same time, Private Marcel was desecrating the body of Yun Kum Yi, the government of Bill Clinton tried to start a war there.

ROK’s emergence as one of the Asian industrial tigers brought with it the big cat of a militant trade union movement that showed the willingness to go toe-to-toe with the army and police in the streets. This militancy was more than matched by the long-standing student-led struggles for self-determination and an end to US occupation. Now that student-labor resistance spread to the general population of Korea, with reunification as its battle cry. The popular resistance to Korean participation in the 1991 aggression against Iraq had been ferocious. This combination of independent development, popular street politics, and a growing movement to reintegrate the two Koreas, was simply too much to bear, and the Clintonistas fell upon a bizarre plan to start a war there to disrupt these threats to US occupation.

Clinton Madness Preceded Bush’s Follies

The Clinton Administration eventually found a new, equally risky method for attacking the Asian economic challenge, when Robert Rubin opened up the hedge fund attacks on the region that almost (inadvertently) toppled the global economy in 1998. But in 1993, the Clinton Administration was hell-bent on an old fashioned military action. Those of us who are amazed by the Strangelove-like quality of the Bushites should take caution before we posit Democrats as a saner alternative. As you shall see, the Clintonistas were every bit as dangerous and deluded as your favorite neocons.

Early in 1993, the US redirected some of its intercontinental ballistic missiles in Alaska from targets in the former Soviet Union to targets in DPRK. This was in conjunction with the announcement of a massive war game off the coast of Korea. These were both immensely provocative and threatening actions. Imagine an American response should someone abruptly aim dozens of thermonuclear weapons at US cities, then send their navy to within sight of our coasts.

The US press then portrayed DPRK as unstable when it responded by threatening to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The deranged North Koreans – in their irrational paranoia – believed that pointing multi-warhead thermonuclear weapons at them was a hostile act. How dare they?

Once the press did its job of convincing the public that DPRK was in the hands of schizophrenic leadership, the US prevailed on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to demand that DPRK submit to inspection of “undeclared” nuclear sites. The IAEA had never made that demand of any nation before. Never. Pyongyang – in its infinite ‘paranoia’ – regarded this as a hostile act too, and one that was intended to expand intelligence gathering by US delegates with the inspection teams. This, of course, turned out to be true.

With not a whit of evidence – a la Iraq – the Clinton Administration then leveled the claim that DPRK was developing nuclear weapons with plutonium from its Yongbyon reactor. Even though scientists pointed out that DPRK didn’t have the technical wherewithal to use this reactor for weapons-grade plutonium or to convert it into a deliverable weapon, the story was amplified and repeated as gospel by the US press, then echoed worldwide on newswires.

Once the fictional atomic bomb program was developed by the Clintonites, the fiction’s authors demanded that DPRK put an end to it. The whole plan was put on hold after the Somalia debacle, but later, with defense contractor William Perry appointed Defense Secretary, the plan was taken up again to attack DPRK.

The central feature of their proposed opening salvo was to be an attack on the Yongbyon reactor. Perry later admitted, “We readied a detailed plan to attack the Yongbyon facility with precision-guided bombs [manufactured, of course, by Perry’s former employer, Martin-Marietta]. We were highly confident that it could be destroyed without causing a meltdown that would release radioactivity into the air.”

Gregory Elich, who wrote an account of this whole, sorry episode for the Center for Research on Globalization (, understated, “It seems highly dubious that a release of radioactivity could have been avoided.” In fact, bombing a nuclear power plant categorically will cause Chernobyls, or worse, beginning not with core melts, but with ignition of the spent nuclear fuel and volatilization of clouds of gamma-emitting Cesium-137. But Perry and Clinton are regarded as “sane”. DPRK’s leaders, who were the target of this plot, are labeled “insane.”

The Clinton Administration was preparing a war in which they freely admitted among themselves that the “intensity of combat would be greater than any the world has witnessed since the last Korean War.” Given that it would initially center around the ROK capitol of Seoul, where over 10 million people live, that may have been another understatement.

Kim Young-Sam, the ROK president at the time, figured out what was happening when troops started shifting into forward positions, and US warships formed a ring off the coast. He called Bill Clinton and demanded to know just what in the hell was going on. Clinton tried to convince Kim to sign onto this mad adventure, and after half an hour, Kim personally told Clinton not to count on the military of ROK to lift a finger.

Jimmy Carter took his own unilateral action to stop this Second Korean War. On June 15, 1994, Carter met with DPRK leader Kim Il-Sung and, with no authorization whatsoever, arranged a deal wherein DPRK would agree to freeze their upgrades of aging reactors if they could gain assistance with developments of newer, safer ones. This was an offer by DPRK for a diplomatic solution to a malignant crisis manufactured by the Clinton administration. Carter, knowing full well that the entire Clinton Administration was off its medication, then invited CNN to broadcast his meeting with the North Koreans – an unprecedented breach of protocol that may allow history to forgive any of Carter’s earlier sins – which forced the Clinton Administration, described by alarmed State Department insiders as “crestfallen” at the loss of their war, to accept the publicly outstretched diplomatic hand of DPRK.

The economic context of all this brinksmanship within the DPRK was indescribable. A terrible domestic crisis was just beginning to sink in. Its principal trading partner, the USSR had recently disintegrated, which resulted in a steep loss of critical oil and gas supplies. DPRK has one peculiar resource that gave them a temporary fix: uranium. But their low-grade uranium doesn’t work in the light water reactors the US was pushing in its “diplomacy.” The older, graphite moderated reactors, like the one that crashed in Chernobyl, were what they knew how to use. By the time Clinton started his provocations, Russian oil supplies to DPRK had dropped to 10 percent of their Soviet-era level. DPRK would have been more than happy to stay out of the nuclear business altogether, were it not for outrageous economic sanctions pushed by the US that simultaneously limited supply and severely constricted North Korean access to dollars – the currency in which world oil (and world trade) is denominated.

The post-Soviet energy contraction in DPRK was a cautionary tale for all of us in the oil dependent world as we approach global peak production. Fertilizer disappeared. Crops lost yields. Factories closed. Spare parts began to disappear, closing down mines. Lights went out. The heat went off. Then nature stepped in – if you still accept that climate change and its consequences are not androgenic – and kicked DPRK to the ground. Severe floods wrecked a significant portion of its hydroelectric capacity.

This was the situation that forced the proud North Koreans – who had literally cut off lights and heat across this frigid nation, in the rugged spirit of juche sasang – to offer abandonment of its critically needed nuclear power program in the face of US bullying.

One of the least understood (in the US) aspects of US statecraft, to this day, is energy as a political weapon. China understands it. So does Europe.

This was the situation in which DPRK signed onto the Agreed Framework, as it was called, in which the US offered to provide heavy oil to DPRK, which would amount to a whopping eight percent of its energy needs, while they built the new light water reactors.

But in the emerging new international division of labor, DPRK had become the Apaches, untamable and therefore superfluous, and this “treaty” was broken before the ink was dry, with the US demanding yet again invasion inspections, then accusing the Koreans of bad faith when they failed to submit.

And DPRK was now in a position of extreme energy vulnerability. Again, the context was the great sorrow.

In 1995, tremendous floods swept away over 400,000 hectares of prime farmland just before harvest in a nation with a short growing season, and rendered 5 million people who lived on that agricultural land homeless. Records showed it to be the worst flood in a century. To this day, crop yields are affected by that deluge.

The coalmines filled with water. The turbines on the hydroelectric plants clogged and went silent.

In 1996, before recuperation efforts from the 1995 floods could get under way, another series of floods ravaged the nation. In 1997, a severe drought followed that killed 70 percent of DPRK’s corn. On the west coast, that same year, a tidal wave struck. Then came the typhoons that destroyed an additional 29,000 homes. And in 2000-2001 came the worst drought in Korea’s history. In addition to the loss of both crops and seed, there was a water shortage like nothing anyone had experienced in Korea for 1,000 years. This is when the stories began about people eating the bark off of the trees, when the catastrophic cascade that began as an energy crisis combined with economic warfare from the US washed over DPRK like a biblical scourge. And the mainstream press said of this poor, proud nation that they wrecked their own economy.

The people of ROK, however, still seeing their northern neighbors as sisters and brothers, pushed their own government to move toward rapprochement. The arrogance of the Americans only served to awaken the profound latent resentment of occupied ROK. The most recent US provocations are not about starting a war with DPRK, though they might create the conditions for the US to stumble into one. They are designed to stampede the ROK leadership into a crisis that will re-polarize Korea, and disrupt the very nationalism that cries for reunification. Reunification would take away the pretext for the American military presence to China’s south.

Neocon Madness

The Bush strategy of reasserting control over East Asia and the Pacific Rim, however, with Korea as a target, is having the paradoxical effect of elevating the importance, status, and prestige of the primary challenger in the region to US dominance; China, with whom DPRK shares its longest border, and who will take credit if they succeed in defusing the tensions there and block the US government’s revised plans for war. Complicating these relationships is the fear of both ROK and China that any kind of sudden mass economic migrations out of DPRK could deliver a serious blow to their own economies, if and when these tensions abate. It is this combined threat of US provocation and DPRK economic refugees that probably underwrites troop movements along the Sino-Korean border – possibly combined with a Chinese desire to signal the US that there are lines that cannot be crossed even for the infinitely pragmatic Chinese.

The tensions in the region have not been improved by the Japanese acquiescence this year to the US request to station “theater missile defenses” on Japanese soil. In response, DPRK said on October 5, 2003 that they would no longer confer with the Japanese in the multilateral negotiations, and again the press has utterly failed to mention the real missiles, and referred only to ‘North Korean” recalcitrance.

US saber rattling and alarmism about “North Korean” nuclear weapons becomes more than a little hypocritical when one considers, as Covert Action Quarterly’s Karen Talbot points out, “the U.S., which possesses by far the largest arsenal of nuclear armaments, has failed to abide by Article VI of the Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which stipulates that the nuclear weapons states, including the U.S., accomplish the total and unequivocal elimination of their nuclear weapons. The existence of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is bound to lead other nations to try to acquire such weapons. Washington is maintaining a double standard by requiring other nations to respect the NPT when the U.S. is planning to develop new nuclear weapons.” [italics mine-SG]

New nuclear weapons specifically designed with Korea in mind.

Rumsfeld this year notified the military of his intent to redeploy forward-based US troops along the DMZ back toward Taegu, not to retreat, but to convert the DMZ, and Seoul with its 10 millions into a potential impact area for a war of extermination against the North. That’s why the Bush Administration is pushing research into low-yield atomic bunker penetrating munitions (which will be the dirtiest nuclear weapons yet). DPRK has organized its whole society for war and civil defense literally underground, and the nation is a vast catacomb of tunnels and underground bunkers.

But the Chinese, sensing American military and political weakness with the quagmire in Iraq deepening, the domestic legitimacy of the Bush administration waning now in the face of one revelation of perfidy on top of another, may be looking at an historic opportunity in the region, possibly even a decisive move to displace Japan as the Asian center of gravity.

The Hu Jintao government – even as they move to militarily secure their borders against any Korean exodus north – knows that DPRK knows that China is their last best hope in the confrontation with America. China is now in a position to arrange a settlement of the “North Korean nuclear crisis”, turning the US-grown diplomatic lemon into lemonade for Beijing.

Everyone, including the mad hatters in the Bush cabinet – with the possible exception of Donald Rumsfeld, who I have convinced myself has a neurological disorder – knows that US military ground capacity is now stretched to its absolute limit, and it is slowly dawning even on the most obtuse that the historical military blip that was “victory from the air” was anomalous. Iraq will likely be the Bush Waterloo, and the inevitable attempt to recoup from this even after a political transition in the US will be fraught with difficulty, and immensely complicated.

It will likely be China, and not the International Atomic Energy Agency, who oversees the “de-proliferation” of DPRK.

It will be the United States that continues to throw its shoulder up against the military, political, financial, and energetic limits to growth. Which card will fall first is still an open question. Rumsfeld’s manic visions notwithstanding, the Bush administration will probably go down in ignominy – sooner rather than later – and the next Korean War, we can only hope, will wither away unfulfilled in the beleaguered consciousness of this administration as it thankfully did with Clinton’s.

Portions of this essay are taken from Stan Goff’s upcoming book “Full Spectrum Disorder: The Military in the New American Century” (Soft Skull Press, 2004).